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1 Introduction
Are explicit monetary incentive schemes necessarily the best way to motivate economic agents to
perform in accordance with social objectives? We discuss the issue based on an empirical study
of the behaviour of health care and long-term care providers in Norway. Our point of departure
is principal-agent theory. Much theoretical research has been devoted to how conflicting interest
between a principal and an agent can optimally be aligned. In cases of symmetric information,
the alignment is based on instructions. In the more interesting cases where the relationship can
be described as one of asymmetric information, the optimal reward scheme involves monetary
incentives. The principal designs a revelation mechanism altering the relative prices such that
the agent, depending on its type, chooses the optimal level of eﬀort. This revelation comes
at a cost, i.e., the agent receives an information rent. In the case of regulation, much of the
same logic applies. The regulator (social planner) designs an incentive scheme that makes the
regulated firm perform in the best interest of society.
In recent years, principal-agent theory has been challenged both theoretically and empirically
on the grounds that information rent is potentially not the only cost component. The theory
of motivation crowding stresses the link between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation (see Frey,
1997, for a comprehensive treatment). In particular, the theory stipulates that some forms of
external interventions — for example, the use of explicit monetary incentives — might undermine
the agent’s intrinsic motivation to perform a particular task and have unintentional adverse
eﬀects in the form of lower eﬀort. The presence of such crowding eﬀects for the case of external
monetary rewards has long been recognised in the field of cognitive psychology, where the eﬀect
has been termed ‘The Hidden Cost of Reward’ (see, e.g., Lepper and Greene, 1978). For the
purpose of economics, this eﬀect has later been generalised (Frey, 1997) to potentially emanate
from all kinds of external interventions and regulations, be they positive (rewards) or negative
(punishment).
In order to incorporate the concept of intrinsic motivation into economic thinking and mod-
elling, there are at least two approaches one could take. In the Motivation Crowding Theory
as proposed by Frey (1997), a change in intrinsic motivation — resulting from some external
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intervention — is attributed to a change in preferences.1 Bénabou and Tirole (2003, 2006), on
the other hand, maintain the standard economics assumption of fixed preferences and attribute
a change in intrinsic motivation to a change in the agent’s perception of the performed task or
the perception of himself. In the latter approach, the signalling eﬀect of diﬀerent types of exter-
nal intervention on the agent’s information plays a crucial role in explaining the link between
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation.
The survey by Frey and Jegens (2001) shows that not only is the motivation crowding eﬀect
a theoretical possibility, but also an eﬀect of empirical relevance. In addition to an abundance of
experimental evidence, especially in psychology, but also to an increasing extent in economics,
there are several econometric studies identifying motivation crowding eﬀects, including Barkema
(1995), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2000). The quite famous
study by Gneezy and Rustichini can serve as an illustrative example. They studied the eﬀect of
introducing a fine for parents who came too late to collect their children at a day-care centre in
Israel. This led, paradoxically, to a substantial increase in the number of latecoming parents,
something that cannot be explained by standard economic incentive theory. However, such an
outcome would be consistent with a motivation crowding story: the introduction of monetary
fines undermined the parents’ intrinsic motivation for collecting their children on time.
Our study is also an empirical investigation of how punishment may adversely aﬀect eﬀort.
In particular, we study the eﬀects of fining owners of long-term care institutions who prolong
hospital length of stay (LOS), driving hospital costs upwards and causing bed-blocking. How
should the interaction between hospitals and primary care be regulated in order to achieve
shorter LOS and better overall care for the elderly? Should the Ministry of Health rely on
letting the hospitals use monetary punishment of the municipalities that are not able to provide
long-term care in time? Or by relying on implicit incentives stimulating the agents to coordinate
their eﬀorts?
By exploiting changes in the catchment areas of two large hospitals located in the metropol-
1Lai et al. (2003) follow this approach in a theoretical study of environmental regulations and social norms,
where firms’ intrinsic motivation for complying with environmental norms is aﬀected by extrinsically imposed
regulation (pollution taxes). The motivation crowding eﬀects of price-incentive based policies in environmental
management is also discussed by Frey (1993).
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itan area of the capital of Norway (Oslo), we can study whether long-term care institutions
respond to changes in the way their interaction with hospitals are regulated. Henceforth, we
have a natural experiment in which we can study the eﬀects on LOS of patients belonging
to municipalities that first were faced with punishment from one of the hospitals and subse-
quently invited to a closer cooperation, without economic punishment, with the new hospital,
i.e., changes from punishment to dialogue and vice versa
Our results support previous studies that incentives schemes or regulatory eﬀorts based on
monetary punishment may lead to sub-optimal allocation of resources compared to regimes
not relying on monetary incentives. In particular, we find that LOS changes as result of the
change in extrinsic motivation (or contingent rewards, here punishment through fines vs non-
punishment) that the long-term care providers are faced with. Both LOS and bed-blocking are
reduced for patients belonging to municipalities that are transferred from a hospital relying on
the punishment strategy to a hospital relying on cooperation, and LOS and bed-blocking are
increased for patients belonging to municipalities that are transferred the other way around.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 the institutional setting is discussed in some
detail. Section 3 presents a theoretical framework in the context of motivation crowding. Data
and descriptive statistics are given in Section 4, while Section 5 presents the econometric method.
Results are reported in Section 6, while Section 7 closes the paper with some discussion and
concluding remarks.
2 Institutional background
The Norwegian government has for years been concerned with long hospital length of stay
(LOS) in general and bed-blocking by elderly patients in particular. The responsibility for
elderly patients is divided between state owned hospitals2, which are responsible for specialist
2From 1 July 1997 activity based financing (ABF) was introduced in the hospital sector. Initially 30 % of the
expected cost was paid according to activity (the number of patients treated and the patients’ DRGs) while 70
% came from a block grant. In 2002 and 2003 the activity-based component was increased to, respectively, 55
and 60 %, while the component was reduced back to 30 % in 2005. In 2005 the daily average operation cost in
Norwegian hospitals amounts to 7-8.000 NOK (SAMDATA).
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care, and patients’ home municipalities3, having the responsibility for long-term care. By this
division of responsibility, municipalities and hospitals have conflicting interests regarding length
of stay, which is an important cost component for either of the parties.
When an old, frail patient leaves the hospital after medical treatment the responsibility is
carried over from the hospital to the patient’s home municipality, a transfer which require coor-
dination and cooperation between two governmental levels. One regulatory policy to facilitate
a smooth transfer has been that all hospitals and all municipalities are expected to have a co-
ordinating unit for transfers between hospitals and long term care services (HOD 2001). The
coordinating unit at the hospital is supposed to contact the coordinating unit in the municipal-
ity when a patient’ discharge date and need for care is clarified. The coordinating unit in the
municipality, on the other hand, will decide when to admit the patient and is responsible for
allocating the necessary care resources (nursing home, home nursing, etc.) to the patient.
Another regulatory eﬀort to initiate an early transfer has been to allow hospitals to impose
penalty payment to municipalities that cannot provide care services in time (HOD 1998). This
administrative regulation is designed such that the hospital can require a daily payment if the
patient still stays in hospital ten days (seven in Oslo) after the medical treatment is completed;
i.e., ten (seven) days after the hospital has put up a discharge date for the patient. The daily
penalty rate amounts to 1.600 NOK (2.000 NOK in Oslo).4 However, not all hospitals make use
of the administrative regulation that allows them to punish the municipalities economically. In
fact, we have a natural experiment taking place in two Norwegian hospitals where one of the
hospitals make us of penalty payment, while the other hospital do not use this possibility. Instead
the hospital — in cooperation with the municipalities in the catchment area — has worked out a
contractual obligation that is based on dialogue between the two parties and in detail regulates
the discharge process. In the following we call the first hospital the ‘payment hospital’ (P), while
the other is called the ‘dialogue hospital’ (D).5 In April 2004 parts of Hospital P’s catchment
3The organisation of primary health care and caring services (both nursing homes and home care) in Norway is
the responsibility of the municipalities, which is the lowest governmental level. The municipalities are responsible
for the finance of caring services, and nursing homes are financed through a yearly block grant. Primary health
care is partly financed by the municipalities and partly by the state (via the national insurance company).
4There are no national registrations on average daily operation costs in Norwegian nursing homes, but it seems
that an honest estimate is between 1.500 and 1.700 NOK (personal communication).
5We use the terms ‘payment hospital’ and ‘dialogue hospital’ to distinguish the two diﬀerent regimes. However,
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area were transferred to D, while parts of Hospital D’s catchment area were transferred to
P. Comparing length of stay for patients residing in these diﬀerent areas before and after the
structural change, this natural experiment makes the basis of the current analysis.
3 A motivation crowding theory framework
As mentioned in the Introduction, the basic idea that monetary incentives may crowd out
intrinsic motivation has a strong grounding in psychology, with literature dating back to the
early 1970s.6 In particular, the relationship between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation has been
understood to work through two diﬀerent psychological processes (see, e.g., Frey and Degen,
2001):
(i) Increased extrinsic control may lead to reduced self-determination. When a higher degree
of extrinsic control is imposed on an agent, the agent may feel less responsible and perceives
his original intrinsic motivation to be overjustified. Thus, the agent may substitute intrinsic
motivation for extrinsic control.
(ii) Increased extrinsic control may lead to reduced self-esteem. Depending on the nature of
the extrinsic control, the agent may perceive outside intervention as an eﬀective rejection of his
intrinsic motivation. As a result, the agent may reduce his eﬀort.
It is worth mentioning that the motivation crowding theory also opens up for the possibility
that extrinsic control crowds in intrinsic motivation. In general, external interventions are
expected to crowd out intrinsic motivation if the interventions are perceived to be controlling,
but crowd in intrinsic motivation if they are perceived to be supportive (Frey and Degen, 2001).
Furthermore, the likelihood of a crowding out eﬀect is also determined by the cognitive conditions
characterising the principal-agent relationship. For example, crowding out is more likely if
a punishment or reward is perceived as a lack of recognition, where the agent feels that the
principal mistrusts or undervalues the agent’s intrinsic motivation. Crowding out is also more
it is important to emphasise that the ‘payment hospital’ is of course free to use cooperation and dialogue in addition
to a penalty payment, in order to ease transfer of patients from the hospital to the long-term care institutions.
Thus, the important distinction is really between using economic punishment (penalty payment) or not.
6Early key references in the field of cognitive psychology are Deci (1971, 1972). See also, e.g., Frey (1993) and
Frey and Degen (2001) for discussion and overview of the key literature.
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likely to occur if the punishment or reward is perceived by the agent to be unfair, or even
immoral (see, e.g., Frey, 2001, for more discussion).
In the context of the present study, it is reasonable to assume that the ‘punishment’ scheme,
with monetary fines for hospital bed-blocking, would be perceived as a controlling intervention,
with an expected crowding-out eﬀect on intrinsic motivation. We can illustrate the postulated
link between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation in a simple, stylised model of hospital bed-
blocking. Consider an elderly patient who — after having undergone hospital treatment — is
ready to be discharged from hospital H at time 0. However, the patient can only be discharged
once the long-term care provider L accepts to admit the patient. Let the date of patient transfer
from H to L be given by τ ≥ 0. The expected total time of care is given by t ≥ τ ≥ 0. Notice
that τ > 0 implies bed-blocking. We assume that the objective function of L is given by
Ω = r
£
t− τ
¤
− CL
¡
t− τ
¢
− pτ + α
£
UH (τ) + UL
¡
t− τ
¢¤
− β (p) [CH (τ)− pτ ] , (1)
where r is the daily fee (paid by the patient and/or third-party payers) for long-term care;
CH (·) is the cost of long-term care as a function of the length of stay; UL (·) and UH (·) are
patient utility of, respectively, long-term care and hospital stay post-treatment, as functions of
the length of stay; p is the daily fine for bed-blocking, issued by H; and CH (·) is the cost of
hospital care after the patient is ready to be discharged, which includes both the direct cost of
hospital stay post-treatment and the indirect cost of postponed treatment for patients on the
hospital waiting list. We assume that C 0i (·) > 0, C 00i (·) ≥ 0, U 0i (·) > 0 and U 00i (·) < 0, where
i = L,H.
The objectives of L that go beyond pure economic profits, are reflected by the parameters α
and β. In line with the quite standard assumptions of partially altruistic health care providers,
we assume that patient utility is partially included in the objective function of L, with the degree
of altruism measured by α ∈ (0, 1). In addition, the parameter β ∈ (0, 1) reflects the extent
to which L takes into account the hospital costs of bed-blocking when deciding when to admit
the patient for long-term care. Thus, we interpret β as the degree of intrinsic motivation of the
management/owners of L to contribute to a social good by limiting the extent of hospital bed-
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blocking. The insight from the motivation crowding theory, as discussed above, is incorporated
into the model in a reduced-form manner by letting β be a function of the extrinsic incentive
parameter p, where β0 (p) < 0, implying that extrinsic, monetary incentives crowd out intrinsic
motivation.
The extent of hospital bed-blocking is determined by the choice of τ that maximises Ω. The
first-order condition can be expressed as7
C0L = r + p+ α
¡
U 0L − U 0H
¢
+ β
¡
C 0H − p
¢
. (2)
The left-hand side of (2) is the marginal profit gain of increasing bed-blocking, consisting of
reduced care costs. The right-hand side is the marginal cost of increasing bed-blocking, consisting
of four diﬀerent terms. The first term is the foregone payment for the patient whose admittance
is prolonged; the second term is the extra payment to the hospital due to the daily fine; the third
term is the net patient utility loss of having to stay longer in hospital before being admitted
to the long-term care institution,8 weighted by the parameter α; finally, the fourth term is the
marginal hospital cost of bed-blocking net of the fine (i.e., the part of the costs that are not
paid for by L), weighted by the parameter β.
What is the eﬀect of imposing an economic punishment scheme on the long-term care institu-
tion, in order to reduce hospital bed-blocking? We can illustrate the trade-oﬀ between extrinsic
and intrinsic motivation by considering the eﬀect of a marginal increase in p on L’s optimal
choice of admittance date, τ∗. Totally diﬀerentiating (2), the marginal eﬀect of an increase in
the daily fine on bed-blocking is given by
∂τ∗
∂p =
(1− β) + β0 (p) [C 0H − p]
∂2Ω/∂τ2 . (3)
It is naturally diﬃcult to make clear-cut predictions for the empirical analysis, since the sign of
∂τ∗/∂p depends on the strength of a postulated crowding eﬀect — given by β0 (p) — that is not
7Our assumptions on Ci (·) and Ui (·) ensure that Ω is concave in τ , guaranteeing that the second-order
condition is satisfied.
8 It is likely that patient utility is higher when staying in the long-term care institution than at the hospital,
since the former specialises in the care of elderly patients.
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directly observable. However, we can use this simple model for two inter-related purposes; (i)
to identify some necessary conditions, based on observable variables, that need to be satisfied
in order for a counter-productive eﬀect of economic punishment (i.e., ∂τ∗/∂p > 0) to be a
possibility, and (ii) to identify under which circumstances a counter-productive eﬀect is more
likely to occur.
Regarding (i), there are two necessary conditions that must be met. First, in an interior
solution, the sign of ∂τ∗/∂p is ambiguous only if p < C 0H . In other words, a counter-productive
eﬀect of imposing a daily fine on bed-blocking is a possibility only if the fine does not fully cover
the costs of bed-blocking. Second, and given that p < C 0H , in order to have an interior solution
with bed-blocking, i.e., τ∗ > 0, we see from (2) that the marginal cost of long-term care, C 0L,
must generally be higher than the daily fine, p.9
Regarding (ii), given that the above two necessary conditions are satisfied, we can use (3) to
derive the following condition for a positive relationship between p and τ∗ :
∂τ∗
∂p > 0 if
¯¯
β0 (p)
¯¯
> 1− βC 0H − p
. (4)
Obviously, the motivation crowding eﬀect, measured by β0 (p), must be suﬃciently strong in order
for economic punishment, measured by p, to have a counter-productive eﬀect. Furthermore, for a
given magnitude of the crowding eﬀect, we see that stronger economic incentives are more likely
to have a counter-productive eﬀect if the intrinsic motivation (β) is higher to begin with, and
if the extrinsic motivation (p) is lower to begin with. While the degree of intrinsic motivation,
measured by β, is not directly observable, the degree of extrinsic motivation is. Here it is
worthwhile to notice that, while we have modelled a linear fine p, the ‘punishment regime’ in
our experiment, as discussed in the previous section, corresponds to a non-linear fine, where the
p = 0 for τ < bτ (where bτ = 7 in Oslo and bτ = 10 in the other catchment areas) and p > 0 for
τ ≥ bτ . Thus, in order to apply our theoretical model to the experiment, we have to consider
two cases separately:
9The only exeption is the (unrealistic) case where there is a net utility gain for patients of staying longer in
hospital, and the term α (U 0L − U 0H) < 0 is suﬃciently large in absolute value to dominate other eﬀects.
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1. If the solution to (2) is given by τ∗ ≥ bτ , the trade-oﬀ between extrinsic versus intrinsic
motivation is given by (4), and the above discussion of the relative strengths of the diﬀerent
eﬀects applies.
2. If the solution to (2) is given by 0 < τ∗ < bτ , we can derive a clear-cut prediction about
the eﬀect of introducing a payment scheme, depending on one fundamental assumption:
(a) If introducing a payment scheme crowds out intrinsic motivation only for strictly
positive values of p, such a scheme has no eﬀect on bed-blocking if 0 < τ∗ < bτ .
(b) If introducing a payment scheme crowds out intrinsic motivation also for p = 0, such
a scheme will unambiguously increase bed-blocking if 0 < τ∗ < bτ . The interpretation
here is that it is the implementation of a payment scheme in itself, and not the
actual size of the daily fine, that crowds out intrinsic motivation. Technically, we can
represent this case by assuming that β := β0 in the absence of a payment scheme,
and β := βP (p) in the presence of such a scheme, with βP (p) < β0 for all p ≥ 0. It
follows from (2) that τ∗ (βP ) > τ∗ (β0) for p = 0.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
In the empirical part of this paper we study hospital length of stay (LOS) for elderly patients.
The patient data are taken from the Norwegian Patient Register (NPR) for the years 2002 to
2005. For each patient we have information on length of stay (LOS), age, gender, DRG-weight,
diagnoses, number of co-morbidities, whether or not the admission was planned, whether or
not the patient is discharged to an institution, the patient’s home municipality, etc. We focus
on two university hospitals, the first (Hospital P) located in Oslo and the second (Hospital D)
located in Akershus, a neighbouring county to Oslo. Table 1 shows average length of stay for
patients hospitalized at the two hospitals in 2002 to 2005. From the table we see that LOS for
patients younger than 40 was almost the same at the two hospitals, but that LOS for elderly
patients, especially patients older than 67, was considerably longer at Hospital P. A possible
explanation for these striking diﬀerences is that the hospitals have chosen diﬀerent strategies for
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coping with bed-blocking. Hospital P has, based on options made available by the Norwegian
Ministry of Health, decided to fine the city districts/municipalities that cannot supply long-term
care in time for their elderly patients. Hospital D’s strategy is to develop ways of coordinating
the discharge process with the patient’s home municipality and by using resources bolstering
cooperation between the hospital and the municipalities the hospital serves.
We have no direct information on whether or not a patient is in need for care after hospi-
talization, and we therefore restrict our sample to individuals older than 67 who are discharged
from hospital to a long-term care institution. For these patients, it is quite clear that the hospital
LOS is directly influenced by the municipalities (long-term care providers) since they cannot be
discharged from hospital before an institution accepts to admit them. We further restrict our
sample to include planned admissions since planned admissions for elderly patients to a large
extent follow the catchment areas of the hospitals.
Our contribution is based on what can be termed a natural experiment. Before 2004, the
catchment area of Hospital P consisted of city districts in Oslo, while the catchment area of
Hospital D consisted of municipalities in the neighbouring county. In April 2004, two city
districts in Oslo were transferred to the catchment area of Hospital D, while, at the same time,
three municipalities were transferred to the catchment area of the hospital located in Oslo
(Hospital P). In Table 2 we see that before the reform (in 2002 and 2003) very few patients
were admitted to the hospital outside the original catchment areas. In 2005, however, 440
patients originally belonging to Hospital D’s catchment area were treated at Hospital P, while
471 patients that previously belonged to Hospital P’s catchment area were treated at Hospital
D. Our main interest in this paper is how the coordinating units in municipalities/city districts
that were faced with a new regime towards bed-blocking reacted on this change, compared to
coordinating units in other municipalities/city districts in the hospitals’ catchment areas. To
analyse this issue, we focus on LOS for four groups of patients discharged from a hospital to
an institution. The first group consists of patients living in the two city districts that were
transferred from Hospital P to Hospital D (P-D), the second group is the patients living in city
districts belonging to Hospital P for the entire period (P), the third group is the patients living
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in the municipalities transferred from Hospital D to Hospital P (D-P), while the fourth group
consists of patients living in municipalities belonging to Hospital D for the entire period (D).
Table 3 gives descriptive statistics for the four diﬀerent groups of patients identified above.
We first notice that the patients are quite similar on observable variables like age, gender, DRG-
weight, etc10. However, the most interesting information in Table 3 is the diﬀerences in LOS
between the patients belonging to groups P-D and P, and groups D-P and D, respectively. From
column one and two in the table, we see that patients from Hospital P’s original catchment area
on average had 2.59 days longer LOS if they are treated at Hospital P compared to patients
treated at Hospital D. However, for patients living in the original catchment area of Hospital
D, we find that patients treated at Hospital P had almost the same LOS as patients treated
at Hospital D. For patients from Hospital D’s original catchment area, we are able to calculate
average LOS for diﬀerent groups of municipalities over time.11 In Table 4, we report LOS over
time for the three municipalities transferred from Hospital D to Hospital P, compared with LOS
for the municipalities that belonged to Hospital D for the whole period. Patients in the D-P
group had an increase in average LOS of around 2.5 days in the period from 2002/2003 to 2005.
Patients living in the municipalities that had Hospital D as their hospital for the entire period,
had quite stable LOS, but these LOS were much longer compared with LOS for patients from
the municipalities that changed catchment area. This explains why we do not see any diﬀerences
in LOS between the D-P and the D groups in Table 3.
5 Econometric model
The descriptive statistics presented in Section 4 suggest that the coordinating units in municipal-
ities/city districts respond to monetary incentives towards bed-blocking in a counter-productive
way. Long-term care providers seem to increase hospital LOS in a regime with monetary fines
for bed-blocking, and to reduce hospital LOS when the ‘punishment regime’ is removed. In
this section we outline an econometric framework to identify the eﬀects of the incentive scheme
10The variable ‘Home to institution’ is 1 for patients admitted from home and discharged to an institution after
hospitalization
11Unfortunately, due to a reform reducing the number of districts from 25 to 15 in 2004, this is not possible for
the city districts in Oslo.
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towards bed-blocking more carefully. Our main estimation strategy is to utilize the change
of catchment areas between the hospitals we study. Ideally, in order to capture the eﬀects of
changing catchment areas, we would like to know what the LOS would have been if the patients
were treated at the hospital in the original catchment area. Since we only observe LOS for
these patients with the imposed reform, we let LOS for patients that did not change catchment
areas represent the counterfactual. Having panel data from 2002-2005, we are able to compare
inter-temporal variation in LOS before and after the imposition of the reform. Therefore, identi-
fication relies not only on a before-after comparison, but also on comparison of LOS for patients
changing hospital subject to the change in catchment areas with LOS for patients not aﬀected
to the reform. Further, following the convention from the treatment literature, we not only have
individuals going from an ‘untreated’ state to a ‘treated’ state, but also individuals that go from
a ‘treated’ to an ‘untreated’ state.
In the estimations we employ the following diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model:
LOS = α+Xitβ1 + Zmtβ2 + γ1DP_D + γ2DD_P + am + δt + εimt. (5)
Here, Xit contains time variant observable individual patient characteristics controlling for case-
mix, Zmt contains time variant observable municipal characteristics, am is a municipality fixed
eﬀect12, δt is a time specific eﬀect and εimt is the usual error term. DP_D is a variable that
equals 1 for patients living in Oslo but treated at the hospital located in the neighbouring county,
while DD_P is a variable that equals 1 for patients living in the neighbouring county, but treated
at the hospital located in Oslo. Therefore, the two dummy variables DP_D and DD_P should
capture the eﬀect on hospital LOS of the change in catchment areas.
6 Estimation results
Based on the discussion and analysis in Section 3, we would expect longer LOS and bed-blocking
at the ‘payment hospital’ compared with the other hospital if motivation crowding is the dom-
12Oslo is treated as one administrative unit.
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inant eﬀect of the punishment scheme. The results from the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences models
reported in Table 5 seem to confirm this. In the table we report results from two diﬀerent
regressions. In the regression reported in column one, the dependent variable is the total length
of stay. For a small subsample of patients13 we also know the ready-for-discharge date, and in
column two we present results where the dependent variable is length of stay above this date.
The last variable is interesting, since it is a direct measure of bed-blocking which should be
unaﬀected by how eﬃcient the hospitals are in treating their patients.
Commenting first on variables describing patient individual characteristics, notice that the
coeﬃcient of the age variable (Age) is negative and significant. At first glance, this result might
seem unexpected. One reason behind the result could be that older patients are more likely to be
transferred earlier from a hospital to another institution to receive care, terminal or otherwise,
compared to younger patients with the same illness. Furthermore, men (Male) stay longer at
hospital compared to women, but the gender eﬀect is small. As expected, we find that higher
DRG weight implies longer LOS. An increase in the DRG weight of one point increases LOS
with approximately 1.60 days. Number of co-morbidities is also significant and an additional
co-morbidity increases LOS with approximately 1.84 days. We notice that there are significant
diﬀerences in LOS between the diagnoses. Patients given the diagnosis malignant neoplasm stay
on average over four days longer at hospital compared to the benchmark group that consist
of all other diagnosis except Diseases in the circulatory system and Diseases in the respiratory
system, which stay approximately three and two days longer, respectively. We find it interesting
that patients admitted to hospital from their home and discharged to an institution (Home to
institution) stay longer at hospital (1.8 days) compared to patients that are admitted to hospital
from an institution. An explanation is that these patients constitute an increased care demand
for the long-term care providers and that the results follow from supply side limitations.
Having controlled for patient individual characteristics and case-mix, the explanatory vari-
ables that capture the eﬀects of the two diﬀerent incentive systems — From P to D and From
D to P — are both significant. Recall from Section 4 that these variables measure the eﬀect
on LOS for patients belonging to municipalities that change hospital compared to patients who
13For descriptive statistics for this sample, see Table 7 in the Appendix.
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come from municipalities that does not change hospital. The estimation results are interesting.
First, patients previously belonging to Hospital P and subsequently belonging to Hospital D
have on average 2.8 days shorter LOS. Second, patients previously belonging to Hospital D who
subsequently became the responsibility of Hospital P have on average 1.5 days longer LOS.
The estimation results based on the sub-sample of patients for whom there exist ready-
to-be-discharged dates are striking. Commenting only on the key variables, patients living in
municipalities that change hospital From P to D stay approximately 2.3 days shorter at hospital
after their potential discharge date, while the From D to P group of patients stay close to 3 days
longer. These findings indicate that punishment does not contribute to reducing bed-blocking
compared with a scheme without fines, rather the opposite. Nor does punishment have any
advantage in terms of reducing overall LOS as previously shown. In regard to the analysis
presented in Section 3, these findings suggest strong motivation crowding eﬀects of monetary
punishment. It is also interesting to notice that the eﬀects are reasonably symmetric: LOS
increases when monetary punishment is introduced and decreases when the incentive scheme is
removed.14
7 Discussion and concluding remarks
One could argue that the reported results are not indications of diﬀerences in bed-blocking per
se, but rather reflect diﬀerences in treatment techniques between Hospital P and Hospital D
not accounted for in our analysis. We believe our results tell a diﬀerent story, though. Most
importantly, for a sub-sample of patients we observe hospital length of stay above the ready-for-
discharge date. This length of stay should not be aﬀected by treatment techniques, and using
this measure as the dependent variable in the analysis only strengthen our results. Further, if
diﬀerent treatment techniques explain diﬀerences in LOS, we would expect diﬀerent LOS for
patients of all ages. As can be seen in Table 6, this is not the case15. Here we estimate the same
econometric model as above, but focus on diﬀerent age groups of patients. Notice that there are
14This contrasts with the results of the aforementioned study by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), where a removal
of explicit monetary incentives did not have the oppositie eﬀects of introducing the incentives in the first place.
15Because few young patients are transferred from hospital to a long-term care institution, we use all patients
discharged from the two hospitals (the same sample as in Table 1) in these estimations.
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no significant diﬀerences in LOS between the two hospitals for patients younger than 40 years of
age who change hospitals. Neither do we find a significant change in LOS for patients between
40 and 67 who move from Hospital D to Hospital P. In our opinion, the reason behind these
results is that patients younger than 67 years of age are less likely to be in need of long-term
care, at least at an institution. They recover more easily compared to older patients and they
are more likely to have close family to take care of them if need be. We believe these results are
strong indicators of the importance of how the interaction between hospitals and municipalities
are organized. Henceforth, the estimation results for patients 67 years and over are quite robust
in the sense that they are less likely to be attributed to diﬀerences in treatment practice as to
diﬀerences in the way the two hospitals deal with bed-blocking.
We explain our findings by appealing to a motivation crowding story, where explicit monetary
incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation of the agents that are subject to this type of regulation.
At this point, in order to give this story some more weight, we would like to revisit a main
result from our theoretical model in Section 3. Given that we have an interior solution with
bed-blocking (which we do observe in reality), we saw that an a priori ambiguous eﬀect of
introducing monetary incentives relied on the condition that the marginal cost of hospital stay
is higher than the daily fine. In our experiment, the daily penalty rate is 1.600 NOK (2.000
NOK in Oslo), which is well below the estimated average daily operation cost of 7-8.000 NOK
in Norwegian hospitals (see Footnote 2). This suggests that the relevant conditions for plausibly
explaining the results by motivation crowding are present in our experiment. This is also in line
with a general prediction from the motivation crowding literature: relatively small amounts of
extrinsic motivation are more likely to have negative eﬀects on observed pro-social behaviour,
since the motivation crowding eﬀect in this case is more likely to dominate the relative price
eﬀect.16
The main argument against the conclusion that monetary incentives are inferior compared
to dialogue is of course that the design of the fining scheme is sub-optimal: the scheme does
not provide a suﬃcient change in relative prices. If the daily bed-blocking fine is relatively large
compared to marginal cost, the patients’ home municipalities would have strong incentives to
16See, e.g., Meier (2006) for a further discussion of this point..
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reduce LOS for the group of patients we are studying. As obvious as that solution may sound,
in practice it might be hard to implement. It would mean that the regulator is able to determine
the optimal fine for each municipality in the country and be able to update these fines depending
on changes in cost and capacity. The dialogue option, on the other hand, relies on decentralized
decision making and there is no need for the regulator to collect cost information at all.
In a broader sense, our finding may also give support to the claim that using mutual agree-
ments as a way of stimulating interdependent agents ‘to sort out their diﬀerences’ are in some
instances a better solution compared to regulatory schemes based on fines. On the other hand,
the fining scheme represents a fall-back option and may function as a vehicle for the parties
to engage in dialogue: without fines, no dialogue and without dialogue, no substantial changes
in the interaction, which leads to sub-optimal solutions. But still, what we here have termed
‘dialogue’ seems to make it easier for the institutions to agree on basic goals attached to pa-
tients’ well-being and the aim of reducing bed-blocking — both elements will tend to drive LOS
downwards — compared with a regulatory scheme based on fines. This also relates to the the-
oretical discussion in Section 3, where we mentioned the possibility of crowding in of intrinsic
motivation due to external interventions that are perceived to be supportive. Thus, the diﬀerent
outcomes of the ‘dialogue’ and ‘punishment’ regimes could possibly be attributed to a mixture
of crowding in (dialogue) and crowding out (punishment) eﬀects.
By way of conclusion, we also would like to stress that whether or not bed-blocking eventually
could be reduced by imposing monetary fines that are suﬃciently high is somewhat besides the
point here. Our study is not about optimal regulation to reduce hospital bed-blocking; rather, we
wanted to test whether or not explicit monetary incentives would crowd out pro-social motivation
in this particular context. And our results strongly suggest that this is the case. Thus, our results
support the view that monetary incentive schemes may have counter-productive eﬀects and may
not always be the best way to motivate economic agents, given that other options are on the
table.
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 1. Average hospital length of stay (LOS) at Hospital P and Hospital D over time, all 
patients. 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 P D P D P D P D 
Patients younger 
than 40 
3.82 
(4.40) 
3.60 
(5.30) 
3.85 
(4.70) 
3.57 
(5.17) 
3.98 
(5.06) 
3.49 
(5.40) 
4.11 
(6.06) 
3.51 
(5.83) 
Patients between 
40 and 66 
7.30 
(10.88) 
5.47 
(7.93) 
7.37 
(12.76)
5.27 
(7.90) 
7.14 
(11.68)
5.22 
(7.32) 
6.46 
(10.48) 
5.24 
(8.29) 
Patients older 
than 66 
9.63 
(11.77) 
6.64 
(7.10) 
9.16 
(10.99)
6.51 
(7.32) 
9.31 
(12.10)
6.68 
(7.04) 
8.75 
(10.76) 
6.89 
(7.57) 
 
 
Table 2. Number of patients between catchments areas and hospitals over time. 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 P D P D P D P D 
Original catchments 
area Hospital P 
1595 11 1730 22 1329 307 1039 471 
Original catchments 
area Hospital D 
7 1608 3 1745 291 1483 440 1339 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics, patients discharged to an institution. 
 Original catchments area 
Hospital P 
Original catchments area 
Hospital D 
 P - D P D - P D 
Length of stay 9.13 (7.99) 12.75 (14.38) 8.68 (10.83) 8.71 (8.49) 
Age 81.78 (7.06) 82.78 (6.98) 81.03 (6.83) 81.14 (6.98) 
Male 0.35 (0.48) 0.34 (0.48) 0.39 (0.49) 0.40 (0.49) 
DRG weight 1.58 (1.33) 1.51 (1.33) 1.45 (1.04) 1.56 (1.46) 
Number co-morbidities 3.04 (1.74) 3.57 (1.95) 3.47 (1.88) 2.95 (1.70) 
Malignant neoplasms 0.06 (0.23) 0.07 (0.26) 0.04 (0.19) 0.09 (0.29) 
Diseases in the circulatory 
system 
0.28 (0.45) 0.23 (0.42) 0.28 (0.45) 0.29 (0.45) 
Diseases in the respiratory 
system 
0.12 (0.32) 0.09 (0.28) 0.13 (0.34) 0.10 (0.29) 
Home to institution 0.95 (0.43) 0.90 (0.30) 0.91 (0.29) 0.91 (0.29) 
Gross expenses health care 94.11 90.63 72.38 70.91 
Number of observations 772 5732 719 6197 
 
 
Table 4. Average hospital length of stay (LOS) for patients in Hospital P’ catchments area 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Municipalities changing catchments 
area (D - P) 
6.89  
(6.53) 
6.64  
(7.50) 
7.77  
(8.71) 
9.25  
(11.56) 
Municipalities not changing 
catchments area (D) 
11.37  
(12.23) 
10.63 
(11.79) 
11.14 
(12.65) 
10.34 
(10.95) 
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Table 5. Fixed effect analysis of hospital length of stay (LOS) for patients older than 67, 
robust standard errors 
 Length of stay (LOS) LOS above the “ready for 
discharge” date 
Age -0.1542*** (0.0139) -0.0125 (0.0128) 
Male 0.3329* (0.2037) 0.3060* (0.1777) 
DRG weight 1.5919*** (0.1430) 0.0054 (0.0583) 
Number co-morbidities 1.8429*** (0.0667) 0.1357*** (0.0448) 
Malignant neoplasms 4.1818*** (0.1563) 0.8491*** (0.2993) 
Diseases circulatory system 1.9216*** (0.2374) 0.3446* (0.2046) 
Diseases respiratory system 1.2937*** (0.2875) -0.2710 (0.2914) 
Home to institution 1.8006*** (0.2964) -0.4782 (0.3681) 
From P to D -2.8044*** (0.3430) -2.2365*** (0.2694) 
From D to P 1.5310*** (0.4469) 2.9940*** (0.6534) 
Gross expenses health care -0.1126*** (0.0442) -0.1313* (0.0709) 
2003 -1.0457*** (0.2946) 0.2159 (0.4828) 
2004 -0.0873 (0.4194) -0.7515 (0.6174) 
2005 -0.4603 (0.4144) -0.7318 (0.6119) 
Constant 21.5400*** (3.5913) 18.4073*** (5.6329) 
R2 0.17 0.08 
Number of municipalities 16 16 
Number of observations 13420 2666 
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Table 6. Fixed effect analysis of hospital length of stay for patients in different age groups, 
robust standard errors. 
 Younger than 40 Between 40 and 
67 
Between 67 and 
80 
Older than 80 
Age -0.0090*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0222*** 
(0.0059) 
-0.0307*  
(0.0162) 
-0.0823*** 
(0.0126) 
Male 0.0227  
(0.0666) 
0.0516  
(0.0907) 
0.1887  
(0.1157) 
0.0354  
(0.1092) 
DRG weight 2.8513*** 
(0.2020) 
2.2246*** 
(0.1208) 
2.1231*** 
(0.1193) 
1.7594*** 
(0.1180) 
Number of co-
morbidities 
0.7053*** 
(0.0387) 
1.6648*** 
(0.0557) 
1.5661*** 
(0.0532) 
1.3650*** 
(0.0435) 
Malignant neoplasms 1.1928*** 
(0.3530) 
1.7173*** 
(0.2231) 
2.1790*** 
(0.2131) 
2.3476*** 
(0.2266) 
Diseases circulatory 
system 
0.8120***  
(0.2458) 
-0.6228***  
(0.1260) 
-0.3884*** 
(0.1367) 
0.5810***  
(0.1280) 
Diseases respiratory 
system 
-0.8198*** 
(0.0964) 
0.1634  
(0.1817) 
0.0745  
(0.1620) 
0.8592*** 
(0.1504) 
Home to institution 0.4005 
(0.2558) 
2.2831*** 
(0.2477) 
2.5521*** 
(0.1966) 
1.8445*** 
(0.1321) 
From P to D -0.0761  
(0.0849) 
-1.4216***  
(0.1814) 
-1.6312***  
(0.2461) 
-2.1120*** 
(0.1809) 
From D to P -0.1227  
(0.1583) 
0.0834  
(0.2313) 
1.0040***  
(0.3156) 
1.4655*** 
(0.2976) 
Gross expenses health 
care 
-0.0044 
(0.0120) 
0.0159 
(0.0234) 
-0.0165 
(0.0309) 
-0.0435* 
(0.0252) 
2003 -0.1740** 
(0.0753) 
-0.5335*** 
(0.1546) 
-0.5723*** 
(0.1938) 
-0.7978***  
(0.1637) 
2004 -0.1558 
(0.1090) 
-0.7310*** 
(0.2234) 
-0.5567*** 
(0.2895) 
-0.3650  
(0.2404) 
2005 -0.1498*** 
(0.0718) 
-0.9402*** 
(0.2240) 
-0.6745*** 
(0.2876) 
-0.4344* 
(0.2383) 
Constant 1.1143  
(0.1114) 
-1.1923  
(1.7595) 
4.6843*  
(2.5306) 
11.7158***  
(2.2327) 
R2 0.25 0.26 0.21 0.17 
Number of 
municipalities 
16 16 16 16 
Number of observations 41262 33601 24324 24051 
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Table 7. Descriptive statistics, subsample registered with a “ready for discharge” date  
 Original catchments area 
Hospital P 
Original catchments area 
Hospital D 
 P - D P D - P D 
Length of stay (LOS) 12.61 (9.13) 20.12 (15.63) 18.60 (15.96) 13.61 (9.40) 
LOS > “ready for discharge” 
date 
4.08 (3.58) 7.19 (3.69) 6.07 (4.44) 5.37 (5.02) 
Age 82.27 (6.62) 83.51 (6.53) 82.58 (6.48) 81.66 (6.65) 
Male 0.31 (0.46) 0.33 (0.47) 0.36 (0.48) 0.35 (0.48) 
DRG weight 1.68 (0.82) 1.50 (1.48) 1.62 (0.75) 1.80 (1.86) 
Number co-morbidities 3.28 (1.72) 4.08 (1.98) 4.26 (1.81) 3.31 (1.77) 
Malignant neoplasms 0.05 (0.23) 0.11 (0.31) 0.06 (0.23) 0.09 (0.29) 
Diseases in the circulatory 
system 
0.27 (0.44) 0.20 (0.40) 0.30 (0.46) 0.25 (0.43) 
Diseases in the respiratory 
system 
0.11 (0.31) 0.09 (0.28) 0.13 (0.34) 0.07 (0.29) 
Home to institution 0.99 (0.12) 0.94 (0.23) 0.96 (0.21) 0.93 (0.26) 
Gross expenses health care 94.11  90.63 72.38 70.91 
Number of observations 221 1374 89 982 
 
 
 
 
 
 
